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1
The Technical Image and Imagination

“Why Do Typewriters Go ‘Click’?"
The explanation is simple; Clicking is more easily mechanized than sliding. This
becomes clear when cars and film projectors start to go wrong. But this example is
inadequate. Because what lies behind the question is: Why do machines stutter? The
answer is: Because everything there is in the world (and the whole world itself) stutters.
This only becomes clear when one takes a closer look. Democritus already suspected it,
but not until numbers, but not letters, correspond to the world. It is open to calculation
but not to description. Therefore, numbers have to break out of the alphanumeric code
and make themselves independent. Letters entice one into endless discussion about the
world and have to be put to one side as not equal to the task. This is precisely what is
happening. Numbers abandon the alphanumeric code in favor of new codes (the digital
code for example) and they feed computers. Letters (if they want to survive) have to
simulate numbers. This is why typewriters go ‘click’.1

How does the image inform the computer? How is it that the selfie, computer
applications such as Snapchat, home-produced Youtube videos, and other visual media
that seem to be so quintessential to modern internet culture appear to have come out of
nowhere? Fifteen years ago, a description of the amount of shared videos and photos by
the individual and the collective would have sounded bizarre, and yet, they have become
a significant component to modern life. The answer is that these new modes of
decentralized image production did not come out of nowhere, but in fact are at least onehundred years in the making. Modern visual culture, which is computational and
network-based in nature, actually has its roots in the very essence of chemical
photography, first developed as a mass-culture product in the 19th century: “the character
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of the apparatus can be discovered through an analysis of the simple camera, as if in an
embryonic state”.2
The mode of thinking inspired by the photograph, as well as the subject created
by the photographic apparatus, have been present since the camera first became available.
More than the mechanical components of the camera, we must focus on the ethic inspired
by the apparatus which produces technical images, that is, images created by an apparatus
which by necessity diminishes human input. Put short: we use the camera, but the camera
uses us as well.
Through the work of primarily Vilem Flusser I hope to show that current visual
culture is actually nothing more than the coalescing of the photographic ethic first
inspired by the primitive apparatus that is the photographic camera. The truth is not that
images are more computational today, but that there often is a misunderstanding
surrounding the technical image in general. Technical images are primarily
computational. The technical image is an image created by a machine, and by necessity
the technical image excises human activity, or at least degrades it in importance.
If we start with the chemical photo, we will realize that although there are a large
number of possible photos, this number is in fact finite. The number of possible photos is
determined by all of the formal elements, which can be immediately quantized: shutter
speed, aperture, angle, focal length, and so forth. A change in just one of these formal
elements creates a new photo, hence there is a large number of possible photos
programmed within a camera: you can take a photo of a man holding a hat to his face
with a 50mm lens, or with a 100mm lens, or with a 150mm lens. If you keep the same
2
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lens, you can change the shutter speed or aperture in order to create yet another set of
possibilities. The large number of photos programmed within the camera is due to the
immense variability contained not only within these elements, but also within framing,
angles, and so on. But, importantly, the method of the camera is also binary/quantized in
its own grounds and in the way in which it functions: the shutter button (Flusser calls it a
key, and keys control the apparatus) is binary -- on/off. The world of pictures is created
through an understanding of the rules of the apparatus: once we control the quantized
data that determines photographic apparatus, we can produce informed technical images.
By informed we mean technical images which are in dialogue both with the rules of the
apparatus, but also in meaningful dialogue with the world out there which is being
photographed, a world of data points and networks (i.e. non-aesthetic, but rather databased relations):
The true photographer, in the sense meant in this essay, is interested (as
the chess player) in seeing in ever newer ways, and thus, in producing ever
newer, more informative situations. Since its beginnings, the development
of photography has been a process through which the concept of
information has grown more and more conscious.3
The drive for ever more “informational” pictures leads to regular people creating photos
such as the picture on the following page:

3
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The above picture shows a type of selfie produced by a Russian teen who climbed a Hong
Kong skyscraper.5 This sort of activity, although perhaps present in previous generations,
has absolutely exploded in volume in recent years. The sharing aspect of this type of
photography obviously drives this sort of activity. This type of photography expresses the
growing “virtuality” of modern life to a breathtaking degree -- the production of the
photo is intricately linked to the way in which it is shared. Flusser writes that the image
has turned us around: instead of simply looking at images in order to reflect on the world,
we’ve begun to hallucinate in real life as if living within images6:
Images are mediations between the world and human beings. Human
beings ‘ex-ist,’ i.e. the world is not immediately accessible to them and
therefore images are needed to make it comprehensible. However, as soon
as this happens, images come between the world and human beings. They
are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens: instead of representing
the world, they obscure it until human beings’ lives finally become a
function of the images they create. Human beings cease to decode the
4
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images and instead project them, still encoded, into the world ‘out there,’
which meanwhile itself becomes like an image -- a context of scenes, of
states of things.7
The first chapter will highlight what differentiates the technical images from traditional
images, as well as outline the ways in which the technical image anthropomorphizes
informational devices while diluting individual subjectivity. The following chapter will
define the concepts specific to Flusser’s theory of communication and human history,
from his particular notion of the abstract, to the necessary steps in the evolution of the
image and visual thinking that lead to the world of the technical image. In this way there
will be enough accumulated groundwork of Flusser’s theories to describe our present
day, which Flusser describes as the early phases of a telematic faux utopia, where the
technical image is the cornerstone of human connectivity and is indistinguishable from
raw data. The power of the technical image of data comes to redefine the relationship
between the average person and the production of information. Rather than a passive
consumer, the subject is now a creator of information dialectically defined by his
relationship to decentralized informational apparatuses, of which the camera is the
prototype, and the computer/smartphone is the apex.

7
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How are Technical Images Different from “Traditional” Images?
More complex technical images include videos, databases, models, and charts.
This is a crucial point: although databases are number-based, and computer-code is
language based, the underlying thought that structures the way the computer apparatus
works is actually built on the same roots as those of the photographic apparatus. Both are
black boxes with certain rules controlled by keys which are engaged by us; our
engagement with those keys defines us dialectically. As such, computer culture, even in
its non-pictorial iterations, is actually visual culture at its very core. If the concept of a
technical image seems foreign, one should perhaps attempt to approach it from a semiPlatonic space. Plato argued that truth resided in forms, and that the things we see are not
actually the ultimate examples of their form, but rather a particular nested within several
potential subsets of that particular form. 8 9 For instance, you read this essay on a sheet of
paper -- that sheet of paper is, yes, a sheet of paper, but it is not the ultimate sheet of
paper. It is simply an example (i.e. a degraded singular example of a particular form) of a
form paper. Technical images are the same; this is a critical point. The computer image
(or model or database) are not advanced forms of photography -- they are simply
different forms of the technical image which function identically in certain modes having
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to do with their root of having been produced by an apparatus, even if those apparatuses
vary in complication from the simplest black-box camera to the most complex super
computer.
There is sometimes pushback to this kind of language around technical images in
the popular imagination - “it’s just a picture! Look! Is this a big deal? Is this the end of
the world?” As a result, I feel that it is important to outline the significance of thinking
about the technical image. We live in a deeply image-based culture which is, and most
will agree immediately, also increasingly more complex, disorienting, and confusing. In
my mind, such a complex and defining part of our daily lives (the technical image)
deserves not only calm and serenity, but an open minded approach which allows us to
slowly work through the fact that a painting and a computer graphic are different beasts
entirely, despite their potential to represent similar pictorial content. That difference can
be quickly summarized as the absence of human activity. The traditional image, in which
category we must include cave paintings, canvas paintings, sketches, drawings, and so
on, all have one thing in common: they are created by a person. That particular
commonality adds one key feature: lack of informational reliability.10 No matter how
photorealistic any of these images are, whenever we examine them we must start from
the fact that they come from a person -- the artist that creates the image mediates its
transference from the world to the canvas (or cave wall, or paper, and so on). The
technical image, on the other hand, has this transference take place almost scientifically:
through the use of a pre-programmed, reliably repeatable black box. The simplest of
these is the camera, but there are many other such apparatuses. The difference plays out

10
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into how much faith we can have in each of these images. Traditional images are by
necessity merely interpretive: when we look at them, we see someone's take on a
particular scene or object. Technical images, due to their scientific precision, are more
like looking through a window. When we see a black and white photo on a negative, we
are in fact looking at the physical byproduct of light having been exposed on that
negative very precisely. As a result, it is much easier to trust the window of the technical
image. Part of Flusser’s theory is that as technical images spread, and as we become more
and more prolific creators of technical images, they begin to shift from windows into
screens. Their reliability and endless possibilities start to send us into an imaginative
daze. We begin to live in technical images only -- be these pictures, computers programs,
databases, or computer models.11
In 1970 Alvin Toffler wrote that we lived in a state of “Future Shock,” where
things changed so quickly that keeping up was difficult.12 What can we say of 2016? This
is all to say that the most complex technical images, those created by machines
themselves in ways which only machines could, evade coherence entirely. Case in point,
the following map outlining the US strategy in Afghanistan in 2003:
(Image below, from Galloway, The Interface Effect, Page 79)

11
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General McChrystal famously declared “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won
the war.” 14 The judgment seems to be quite clear on whether we “lost” or “won” the
war... Yet the sheer confusion of the image remains. It expresses, quite poignantly,
actually, the fact that we are more than willing to admit total confusion in the face of the
sheer and colossal complication created by the power of technical images.15 Unlike in a
simple technical image, say, a photograph, figuration (the idea that the technical image is
a “picture” which really “looks” like something) does not play a role in the above
13
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technical image. Or perhaps it does, but only in a weird, cruel way: the technical image
above, in its obtuseness, mirrors our bureaucratic and institutional apparatuses in their
creative and exuberant nonsense.
The point is, the technical image above has a purpose quite contrary to “looking
like something”: its utilitarian purpose is simply to impress vastness and
incomprehensibility of the network (we could say apparatus) we call the “the war in
Afghanistan.” “It is unclear what exactly the slide is meant to convey or indeed if it is
meant to convey anything at all... Unlike realism in painting or photography, wherein an
increase in technical detail tends to bring a heightened sense of reality (at least in the
traditional definition of aesthetic realism that has held sway more or less since the
Renaissance), the high level of technical detail visible here overwhelms the human
sensorium, attenuating the viewer’s sense of reality… effectively neutering its capacity as
a vehicle for information.”16 A simplistic response might be to say they look like tangled
webs -- though webs don’t often contain nodes which themselves are obtuse symbols for
vastly complex, themselves likely unrepresentable/possibly incoherent systems, i.e.
“Popular Support.”
There is a YouTube video created by a sea turtle which eloquently expresses this
unworkable, complex technical image. When a diving camera washed ashore in Florida’s
Key West, a local coast guard picked it up.17 He eventually found its owner by posting
the family pictures found on the camera on various diving forums. Soon, the camera’s
origin was discovered: Dutch Naval Officer Dick de Bruin who was vacationing in Aruba

16
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some eleven hundred miles away, lost the camera eighteen months prior.18 Along the
way, somewhere along Honduras, the camera had an encounter with a leatherback sea
turtle: “The marine reptile appears to have used the traveling camera to shoot a short film,
which Shultz [the Florida Coast Guard] found on the memory card among de Bruin’s [the
naval officer’s] pictures.”19 The animal must have mistook the device for food and
snatched at it, eventually hitting the release button (the apparatus key): “The clip that the
camera recorded shows how the turtle plays around with it, banging against it, snapping
at it, and keeping it in constant motion. The images that were captured in the process are
rather shaky, as the camera is incessantly performing hectic tilts and pans.”20
The entire process was automatic from the release of the shutter. Along the
process the shaky and unpredictable footage has no resemblance to human subjectivity,
and yet the video is oddly captivating, having accrued millions of views on YouTube. All
functional steps that happen to the camera are required in order for this video to come
into existence: 1) the camera must be lost, 2) it must be picked up by the turtle, 3) it must
be then found when it washed ashore and finally 4) that video must be posted online. The
apparatus that created this video, then, is not a camera per se, but rather the apparatus of a
global data network, as well as the apparatus (or perhaps, the medium) of the ocean, and
so on, and so forth.21 Human intention is delinked from these technical images, and yet
they are pregnant with the most fascinating, sublime meaning. These technical images are
pregnant with the presence of a global image network -- the Internet. It cannot be
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understood or sympathized with in an anthropomorphized way, because it lacks human
intention.
Yet, the video went viral nearly overnight. The marine reptile is barely seen
throughout the fifteen-minute video and none of the images that it captures are
particularly interesting. Its success on YouTube with a more or less universal (across all
age groups and across a variety of nationalities) audience was more linked to its
production and the interplay of seemingly unconnected agents than any of the movement
on screen. This is understood intuitively – the people watching the film might not be able
to verbalize that this is what they find fascinating about it, but that’s it: the fact that it was
created “by accident” through a complicated interplay of media and networks.
As Leitner eloquently explains, “The sea turtle is an aesthetic object… This
renunciation of traditional aesthetics is only possible because of a hybrid network that
transgresses nationalities, species, and the divides between organic and nonorganic and
between nature and technology. The network consists of a camera and a waterproof case,
a sloppy diver, the currents in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, a sea animal, an
altruistic Coast Guard officer, and a global online community.”22 The ocean, along with
the Internet, is in fact a sort of medium required in order for this video to be produced,
much like a negative is required in order to produce a photo. The widespread interest that
the video accrues has almost nothing to do with any formalistic or aesthetic portion of the
video, but rather with a sublime/structural understanding of how the video was produced,
as well as the emblematic nature of the production’s fluidity and serendipity. The agents

22
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that acted on the production of the sea turtle’s film and brought all of them together is
formless because it is made up of data:
drawing on the shift from solid to fluid performed by the turtle’s
film—as fluid inasmuch as they constitute complex systems, and
trying to get hold of whoever or whatever determines the behavior
of these systems is pointless; there is constantly something slipping
through our fingers. This is because the underlying material is
formless, a property that not only applies to water but also to data,
as Alexander Galloway recently pointed out in connection with
attempts to draw maps of the Internet.23 24
In reality, the turtle video is actually not too dissimilar from the way in which certain
human technical images function. The selfie, easily the most emblematic of all modern
modes of network photography, is often produced and interpreted not on strictly aesthetic
means, but rather through the points of shareable data which it contains. Posting a selfie
is about how things look, yes, but it is in fact much more about prostration before the
network and our place within it. In short, we share images not for representational value,
but to tie ourselves into a larger network and what gives us meaning in connection to
particular data points: “Nevertheless, the images that are exchanged on platforms such as
Facebook seem to form part of an aesthetic practice that conceives of them not primarily
as representational objects in their own right but as components of a system whose
autopoiesis is perpetuated through a constant transmitting and receiving of digital
images.”25 Hence the value of a selfie with, say, a famous person – it is a rare occurrence
and therefore something to be shared as highly informational: “on a particular day I ran
into Obama and took a selfie with him.” Or a selfie which is shared by many other users,

23
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multiplicating its meaning many number of times. Or a selfie taken by a Russian teenager
atop a building. And so I arrive at the fulcrum of my project: my aim is to describe how
the technical image, which is at the very core of our culture today, is in fact a
technologically aided method of thinking (or imagining) which has outstripped our
powers to control it and as a result come to absolutely dominate our lives. Further,
through this domination, the technical image has created a type of visual culture that has
ensnared us silently. Not only are we, in essence, “non-existing” if we refuse to
participate in this global image network but the network and computational visual culture
has evolved and become complex to the point we are often times no longer able to create
meaning within it at all. 26 Rather that meaning is created on a blistering scale by
algorithms which although “dumb” in some sense, are actually able to create things
which begin to confuse us in regards to aesthetic value. A good case in point are Google
Earth Street View images. These are very popular, and quite useful: they are essentially a
series of photos created by cars which drive with full-view cameras perched atop their
roofs. The images created by these cars are often completely uninteresting: a random
street with pedestrians; cars in traffic, etc. Yet here and there certain pictures are picked
up, completely at random, which mirror known aesthetic principles long practiced by
artists, such as in the following example:

26
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The above image was created by a “dumb” apparatus – it merely took millions of
pictures until it arrived at that one. 27 And yet one has a difficult time not aligning the
composition, exposure, and narrative inherent in the image according to our longnurtured aesthetic principles. This might not be so troubling because it is random –
literally the idea that a monkey (or machine) taking random pictures will one day take a
very beautifully composed masterpiece. Much more troubling is the algorithm based on
Google’s “Deep Dream” which uses a neural network capable of “machine learning.”
The Deep Dream system is capable of analyzing particular painter’s styles in order to
create paintings that mimic it. The following set of images is a scale representing Deep
Dream attempting to paint a row of houses in the style of Van Gogh:

27
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Although primitive, this neural network has made great strides towards creating realistic,
“creative” works of art that, chances are, might pass as man-made in front of all but the
most well-trained observers. A researcher with this program writes that their “work offers
a path forward to an algorithmic understanding of how humans create and perceive
artistic imagery”.29 These examples highlight ways in which domains previously thought
to be human are now becoming dominated by machines. Although these example may be
scary to some, they pale in comparison to the problems explored by Flusser in the advent
of the technical image. For Flusser, the encounter with the apparatus is one that
dialectically robotizes man (or woman). The point is not that machines are becoming
28
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more like man, but far more perversely, that the apparatus has made a machine out of
man. As a result, the only way in which we are able to create topical, relevant, up-to-date
information is by doing it as if we were machines. Hence why it is so easy for computers
to mimic our “art forms.” Hence why it is so intuitive for a child to understand that the
turtle video is interesting due to the way in which it was “made” – outside of any human
intention. A nearly infinite variety of bits of meaning and topical information now come
from apparatuses that completely excise us – apparatuses that literally have no humans
driving them.
But why are technical images so magical to us? Why are we so captivated by
them? Why do we feel a need to create them as if by nature? Answers to these questions
require an explanation of the entirety of Flusser’s conception of information and history,
and so will take a while. The quickest way to put it is the following: we went to technical
images in order to better express things/events we could not write about or understand,
things caught in particles, waves, and modes of movement. These “things” we sought to
express are too complicated for words and as a result required the aid of a machine which
could capture them. Our use of these machines reconfigured not only our ability to see,
but also our ability to understand ourselves without the machine and the technical image
(emphasis mine):
The structure of culture -- and therefore of existence itself -- is
undergoing a fundamental change... The magical nature of images
must be taken into account when decoding them… It is wrong to
look for ‘frozen events’ in images… Rather [images] replace
events by states of things and translate them into scenes. The
magical power of images lies in their ‘superficial nature’, and the
dialectic inherent in them… Images are mediations between the
world and human beings. Human beings ‘ex-ist,’ i.e. the world is
not immediately accessible to them and therefore images are
needed to make it comprehensible. However, as soon as this
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happens, images come between the world and human beings. They
are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens: instead of
representing the world, they obscure it until human beings’ lives
finally become a function of the images they create.30 (originally
published in 1984)
By which Flusser means the thrill of creating technical images is such, and so powerful,
that it shines a light into a new mode of thinking, one in which images express not only
our needs but also our desires. Soon we are caught in a world in which to create images is
to express existence itself.
Human beings cease to decode the images and instead project
them, still encoded, into the world ‘out there,’ which meanwhile
itself becomes like an image -- a context of scenes, of states of
things. This reversal of the function of the image can be called
idolatry; we can observe the process at work in the present day: the
technical images currently all around us are in the process of
magically restructuring our reality and turning it into a ‘global
image scenario’. (note: the internet as we know it now in 2016)
Essentially this is a question of ‘amnesia’. Human beings forget
they created the images in order to orientate themselves in the
world. Since they are no longer able to decode them, their lives
become a function of their own images: imagination has turned
into hallucination.31 (published in 1984)
The problem, then, is that this technologically-aided method of thinking (or visualizing,
or “imagi-ning”) completely consumes and codifies us, to the point that nothing is
relevant which is not image based (or which is not online), including our own perception
of ourselves. As a result, the dialectical subject created by the technical image is one
who, perhaps in an act of self-defense, denies the power of the technical image in the first
place. He might point to a photograph and say “this is an image, is this dangerous?” The
correct answer to that question is “Yes, the technical image is dangerous.” The technical
image, run amok, can erase subjectivity and create a world which is posthuman, that is, a
30
31
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world in which that which is truly relevant and truly meaningful is not producible (or
indeed understandable) by people. That is the danger of the technical image: the process
of human intention is at stake. 32
Technical images inspire us with a particular ethic or spirit. Due to this constant
creation, we easily tire of the mundane and everyday image. We intuitively know that
certain pictures express nothing that has not been seen before. The apparatus calls upon
us to produce technical images that are possible and improbable. Part of the thrill of
photography, which even novice photographers experience, has to do with seeing the
world through the camera for the first time. People innately begin to realize that the
images they produce are not based on a figurative representation, like in the way
renaissance paintings often were, but rather on an innate (if somewhat incomprehensible)
vastness contained in the mechanical method of their production. Which is to say, the
technical image dissolves “subjectivity as such and transfers aesthetic agency from a
human creator subject into a hybrid, dispersed actor network”.33 Put simply: part of what
we appreciate about certain technical images today is simply the way in which they are
the byproduct of a massive, all consuming and seemingly uncontrollable world-network,
of which we are a small particle and out of which we seem to struggle to disentangle
ourselves, and this is based on the way apparatuses work, period. They define us as
creators of 2-dimensional images, images that are free to then travel the world away from
our grasp. If the world out there is made of particles, the camera gives us an easy and
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immediate (nearly self-intuitive, when we watch the joy of someone first taking pictures)
way of capturing these particles. Put even more simply, and more perversely, technical
images are how we communicate not only from person to person, but also in a more
devastating and nefarious way: without technical images, we no longer know how we fit
in the world, we are no longer able to make sense of the large number of particles which
dance in front of our eyes. In fact, Flusser comes to argue that post-technical image we
may not fit anywhere at all. Flusser writes that since our digits and our brains are the only
requirements to create information through the apparatus, we will eventually be only that:
a brain connected to digits connected to machines. But not all is lost: a certain human
freedom remains to those who don’t desire to be only brains pumping (and watching
images) forever. You don’t have to watch images all day – there is a way out, which I
detail at the end of this thesis. That possibility, one which will likely shock, will be
revealed at the end of this paper.
Before that, a short detour: one will enjoy a greater understanding and
appreciation of Flusser’s theories and scope through a brief understanding of his
biography. Although he started as a journalist in Sao Paulo, Flusser eventually became
interested in communication, information theory, and the philosophy of photography.34
Vilem Flusser’s scholarly career was international and multilingual. He was born in 1920
to a Jewish family in Prague and escaped the Holocaust in 1940 by fleeing first to
London and eventually to Sao Paulo, Brazil. After a bitter disagreement with his father,
Flusser left Prague with his girlfriend’s family for London. An established member of the
community, Flusser’s father Gustav was unlikely to budge. Early after his arrival in
34
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England, Flusser learned that his immediate family had been sent to concentration camps,
including Auschiwitz and Buchenwald.35 They were all killed there. This left Flusser in a
period of extreme depression that was compounded by his move to Brazil.36 There,
Flusser worked at a Czech warehouse for imported goods. In his spare time he wrote to
an opinion column in a local Sao Paulo newspaper and submitted articles for philosophy
publications. Although depressed over the death of his family, Flusser was happy that he
had finally found a life in which he could “work during the day and philosophize through
the night.”37 After a few years, he started working in a radio factory, increasing his
interest in the philosophy of information and communication. His technical background
as well as his many years of self-guided study of philosophy eventually leading to an
academic position teaching in the Engineering School of the University of Sao Paulo.38
This technical background allowed Flusser deep insights into the nature of information
and its spread.
Flusser published widely in Portuguese, passing his years with a steady stream of
books and newspaper articles. A majority of this early work remains unpublished though
it concerns topics such as language philosophy and Brazilian identity.39 Flusser moved
back to Europe in 1973 where he spent a largely reclusive decade while he struggled to
understand the technical image and the history of visual culture. The study of information
(as well as his personal history in displacement) and its spread led him towards in an
interest in the concept of homelessness, not in the physical sense, but in that of those who
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are forced into exile, a group that grew in numbers in the 20th century and which has
become an important political category. By the 1980s, he had finally developed his
mature concept of the camera as the first widely available computational apparatus.
Starting in 1983, with the publication of Towards a Philosophy of Photography, Flusser
became deeply involved in an ambitious project, attempting to conceptualize media
history’s rising importance in modern culture.40 He eventually began to describe a sort of
intense informational homelessness as the quintessential state of man in modern digital
society. Through his study of photography, data, and networks, Flusser is able to predict
the arrival of online services such as Amazon, Google, and YouTube in the early 1980s,
many years before personal computers and home consumer internet were a reality. He
offers a profound observation on the interconnection of media and the way in which
subjects become controlled. Interestingly enough, Flusser was readily adopted in
Germany as a founder of the fledgling discipline of Media Studies, so much so that the
German Federal Cultural Foundation awards a yearly “Vilem Flusser Theory Award” to
media and digital theorists who have distinguished themselves in the mold of Flusser’s
thinking.41 By contrast, the thinker has been virtually unknown in the English speaking
world, though his notoriety has been quickly rising. His books have been translated at an
ever quickening pace. We live in a house punctured with holes, he wrote, a house with
cables which broadcast both in and out, leaving us without any privacy, and hence
without any home. In 1991, he visited the Czech Republic for the first time since leaving
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as a teenager. He died shortly thereafter in a horrific car accident. His body rests in the
New Jewish Cemetery in the city of his birth.42
I am deeply drawn to Flusser because I believe that he expresses, unlike any other
writer I have ever encountered, the tenuous position that we find ourselves in as
consumers and producers stuck in our current visual culture. It is to my great dismay that
In many classes I have read things that blatantly and completely ignore this modern state.
Rather than prepare us for an increasingly dangerous and more complex
visual/computational landscape, I’ve found that the curriculum actually strives to give us
thinking from a previous era -- from an era in which linearity and causality, rather than
particles and energy, ruled. Particularly disappointing has been the way in which many
students, and unfortunately many professors, fail to understand the way in which
aesthetic regimens which guide our taste and culture are fundamentally class based and
therefore determined, rather than real.
And yet most class discussions completely ignore this fact. Students are allowed
to pontificate on paintings, photographs, films, books, as if their mode of thinking or their
thoughts are provenant from their intellectual curiosity or training. Aesthetic modes of
reading art (and the world) are completely culturally codified and socially installed on
students. Art (images) do not exist in a vacuum and are not readable outside of a
particular culture, no matter how broad this particular artifact is. Works of art require an
aesthetic judgment that meets it halfway. Yet students and faculty do not behave as if this
were the case – they take their taste (intrinsically connected to their class) as proof of
their good nature, of their validity and thoughtfulness. What is praised and highly
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regarded in our classes is unfortunately a carefully camouflaged form of obedience. The
obedient, who through their insistence and tenacity nod so much to the point that they
forget and only agree, are highly regarded in our circles. The obedient student is praised
for his appreciation of centuries-old artifacts, artifacts that are derivative of our culture. A
caveperson encountering a painting would likely not have an aesthetic judgment induced
from it. There is little appreciation to the culturally induced aesthetic judgment. But these
students, who in school have been shielded from harm through their obedience, will one
day be face to face with a blistering, violent world in which valuable information is
created not by obedience and acceptance, but by vision and the apparatus43. This is to
say: our school is stuck in the past, and Flusser speaks to the future.
Flusser’s global image network describes data-driven mediation through images,
and how this mediation comes our functionary qualities. Images are two dimensional and
therefore appear almost magical. Hence they do not capture causality but rather suggest
scenes and relationships between objects caught within it. All of these are simply
“floating” objects which suggest one another. In “life,” the cock’s crowing is triggered by
the morning – there is a linear relationship which when written about only goes one way.
In a painting there is no causality -- the cock’s crowing denotes the morning in the same
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way that the reverse is true, because the painting is a scene that contains these related
objects and events.44 As a result, images (technical or otherwise) live in a world of
“eternal return of the same,” of being stuck and of being in awe.45 As people begin to live
in a world of images, they turn into “reality” and become confused: they begin to treat the
world as it composed of scenes that are “imagined” in the sense that they function as
images.46 Nowadays people live not in a causal relation, but in a “global image network.”
Certain things which are believed in the internet rupture through the fabric of our lives
with intense violence.
The global-image network creates a user (in Flusser’s terms, a functionary) who is
him/herself computational by nature. The functionary is dialectically defined through
contact with the apparatus:
Technical images are produced by apparatuses. In saying this, one
presumes the typical characteristic of apparatus as such -- in a
simplified, embryonic form -- are also contained within the camera
and can be derived from it…” The camera, as a prototype of the
apparatuses that have become so decisive for the present and
immediate future, provides an appropriate starting point for a
general analysis of apparatus -- those apparatuses that, on the one
hand, assumed gigantic size, threatening to disappear from our
field of vision… and, on the other, shrivel up, becoming
microscopic in size so as to totally escape our grasp…
Is a camera a tool like a needle or a pair of scissors? Tools in the
usual sense tear objects from the natural world in order to bring
them to the place (produce them) where the human being is. In this
process they change the form of these objects: they imprint a new,
intentional form onto them. They “inform” them: the object
acquires an unnatural; an improbable form; it becomes cultural.47
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The technical image (of which the photograph is the most defining example), although
sometimes pictorial, is essentially mostly mediated data. This mediation is a form of
contact between an apparatus-defined functionary and the particles that the apparatus
captures. Everyone knows that when they look at a photograph they aren’t seeing the real
thing pictured, but rather an object created as the chemical byproduct of a machine whose
sole purpose is to create that object. The apparatuses that produce technical images call
upon us to act as its users/functionaries in an almost slavish way. Our job becomes
pressing the shutter (or digits of a computer) in order to create highly segmented data
points. As a result, the technical image begins to become a more clearly central part of
computational society: in an information world where data and information is being
created at an absurd pace, the creation of the image through the binary process of
pressing and releasing the shutter is the only way in which we can feel that we create
meaning ourselves, it is the only way in which we feel relevant. This creation takes place
in a, yes, global, but in a sense to a culture that is short lived and brief, one that is datadefined, one that springs not from culturally-determined biases but from ethics which are
suggested by the way in which the apparatus works and the way in which the apparatus
defines us dialectically. The biases, for instance, which lead certain works of art to rise to
prominence within a particular cultural and socio-economic class of people, such as the
mostly very narrowly circumscribed tendencies of the upper class. Yet what is the
meaning of this meaning we create in this data-driven global image network? What is its
purpose? Does it fulfill us? Does it create or shine a light in questions that are profound?
Why is it that, at least in the “developed world”, people with free time and
without worry choose to work, associate with or leisure around the image? Why are
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artists the hippest members of our society? Why is “everyone an artist” nowadays? Why
is it that meaning has been distilled down to the “meme” to such an aggressive degree?
Why is it that entire conversations (rather, scenes and episodes) are suggested by the use
of a familiar image and a line of text that remixes it? People who share and create memes
are remixing all of the possible variations on the information contained within a single
image, and thus mining for further information within an image that seemed as if it was
already spent. This search that users go on, this granular remixing of all particular
readings of a certain image strikes at the very core of the technical image: it is primarily
data, and only pictorial in a derivative sense.
There are certain artists who speak directly to this data-driven, machine mediated
nature of modern visual culture. This is the reason why memes are at the center of our
modern culture: meme-culture is the ultimate granulation of the data-narrative pregnant
within the technical image. Memes are images, videos, or turns of phrase which are
rapidly disseminated through online communities. They often include a reference to a
particular scene or context, and often include a strong emphasis of the applicability of the
referenced scene/context in other places. One common meme practice includes particular
images which denote a certain feeling: one possible example is “Success kid,” a meme
which involved a baby clenching his fist as if celebrating something positive. There are
literally thousands upon thousands of remixed versions of this image which repurpose it
for particular events related to individual internet users. Through the meme, internet users
are able to mine images for more and more meaning and context, until the point in which
all of the contexts and possibilities within the particular scene/context denoted in the
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meme are finally expressed. This is machine-like behavior: it is as if internet users were49
working, in a totally decentralized and unplanned way, to create a database of the entirety
of possibilities having to do with “success” as denoted by this baby.

Through the meme, one image can express an absurd number of situations,
scenes, and contexts. This is essentially the way in which the technical image, and
telematics in particular, work for Flusser. The technical image is an image which contains
within it a variety of contexts, and those contexts can be celebrated by users as they
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remix with each other. An artist that represents this apparatus driven remixing better than
anyone is John Baldessari:

50

Each hat is, in a sense, the same, but, in a very real and total sense, completely different.
What is important is not the content of the photos, but rather the ethic expressed by the
continuous creation of all of these different photos -- they express the work of the
apparatus in its variations. In fact, each photo is unique and granular, despite being nearly
identical, and for all intents and purpose, almost entirely meaningless. The group
expresses the central tenet of Flusser’s thinking: that photos mean not visually, but by the
way in which they define us as readers and capturers of data. In a description of
Baldessari’s mode of creation, Robin Kelsey writes the following:
The aim of the artist was not to be to instruct the viewer but to give
viewers information. Whether the viewer understands this
information is incidental to the artist; he cannot foresee the
understanding of all his viewers. He would follow his
predetermined premise to its conclusion avoiding subjectivity.
Chance, taste or unconsciously remembered forms would play no
part in the outcome. The serial artist does not attempt to produce a
beautiful or mysterious object but functions merely as a clerk
cataloging the results of his premise.51
This makes Baldessari one of the most Flusserian artists. One of his key goals as an artist
is to expose the data-driven nature of our current image cultures. Further, Baldessari,
under the influence of Sol LeWitt, attempts to make himself into a functionary par
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excellence, a programmed robotic creator who simply follows rules towards their
ultimate meaning:
…the artist as clerk carries out a stiff calculus, accumulating
results that follow inexorably from chosen premises. LeWitt
imagines the artist as a kind of bureaucratic cog churning out
mechanically determined outcomes. ‘The idea,’ he said elsewhere,
‘becomes a machine that makes the art.’ Chance plays no part in
the process.’52
Sol LeWitt is a minimalist artist who essentially created rules that then were transferred
into either drawings or sculptures, prints, etc. “The idea,” in LeWitt’s words, is how
LeWitt created. He essentially created rules which were then followed to their completion
resulting in some highly-determined, causal object.53 “The idea,” in our current world and
study, is not an abstract set of rules, but it is also programmed. “The idea” for us is the
apparatus – it is with the apparatus that we think. The apparatus is also programmed – it
contains certain rules that accept certain inputs and spit out certain outputs, all according
to a deterministic, causal program. What both Baldessari and LeWitt understood
intuitively is that modernity is algorithmic -- meaning is created through the carrying out
of particular programs or games. As a result, both LeWitt and Baldessari mimic or
recreate the modes of the apparatus, each in their particular way. Note that both are keen
to reference themselves as robots; as being cogs and parts of a program that they are
simply following along. This is not further from our own existence in a global-image
network: we are cogs who accept and spit out images according to (our own as well as
other) programs. The images that we accept and spit out include photographs, databases,
models, and essays, such as the one you are reading. Now, the global-image network is
52
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exceedingly complicated, far more complicated than the already extremely complicated
camera and computer. As a result, there are certain types of meta-level programming far
beyond our ability to influence. And, as already put forth, the apparatus itself programs
us as functionary users upon our encounter. A large part of whether we are able to escape
this world of technical images and their grasp comes down to whether or not we can
program ourselves. That is, whether or not we are able to, like Baldessari and LeWitt, to
make ourselves into cogs which still know some sort of humanity.
One more extremely instructive work that explains the way in which apparatuses
produce, is LeWitt’s “Sentences on Conceptual Art.”54 Part of LeWitt’s work was to setup circumstances and rules which then were carried out into a particular object much like
the apparatus is its own program which once activated creates the technical image. So
that in this sense the artist, now dictated by the necessity for an audience and by the direct
monetary value of his work, creates a set of rules after which he or she becomes the clerk
of what those rules produced. Sentence 29 of LeWitt’s “Sentences on Conceptual Art”
states the following: “The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It
should run its course.”55 In a way, LeWitt intuitively understood the method of creation
nascent in his own time: that of a program which carries out its instructions until meaning
is created. Through the apparatus, we are all made artists like Baldessari and LeWitt.
Whether or not we know it is another question; whether or not we can program ourselves
free and away from the tightening grip of these apparatuses and the world they create is
yet another.

54

Sol LeWitt. Sentences on Conceptual Art. Altz. N.p., May 1969. Web. 18 Feb. 2016.
<http://www.altx.com/vizarts/conceptual.html>.
55
Sol LeWitt. Sentences

32
Each of the Baldessari photos is its own set of data, and hence each image is its
own remix on the concept, the concept of a man holding a hat over his face. And yet,
taking a step back, we see that each picture only gains total meaning when put next to
others. All pictures only gain total meaning as a set, a set which in reality has
meaninglessness at its very core: it’s a picture of a man holding a hat to his face. How
many million variations exist? At least as many as there are men and hats, and possibly as
many as all of the combinations. In getting entangled and marred in the world of the
technical images, we are all become artists; we have all become remix experts. We have
all become our very own versions of John Baldessari, and yet are we any different from
one another insofar as we are functionaries defined by a decentralized apparatus? What
kind of artist is “created” by a machine? What kind of artist is the same as all the others?
Why are we so driven by this desire to get to the bottom of all possibilities of the
technical image in itself?
It’s hard not to envision a world like the one portrayed in the film Wall-E, in
which people spend most of their lives confined to their chairs in entertainment consoles.
One assumes that from the console, these characters fulfill all their needs, and that any
incidental problem is fixed by a robot servant of some sort. We might one day be the
same way: In the telematic society, that is the faux-utopian end-point of Flusser’s visual
culture world, we find ourselves in “a situation in which everyone contemplates images,
whether it be to receive, to change, or to forward them on, and in which the cycle of the
economy and the process of production takes place behind people’s backs,” performed by
robots.56 Not everything is perfect, however, as the trade off for this feverish dream of
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constant exchange of images is not only the disappearance of our subjectivity, but also
our transformation into a controlled species:
The scenario, the fable, I propose here is this: people will sit in
separate cells, playing with their fingertips on keyboards, staring at
tiny screens, receiving, changing, and sending images. Behind their
backs, robots will bring them things to maintain and reproduce
their derelict bodies. People will be in contact with one another
through their fingertips and so form a dialogical net, a global
superbrain, whose function will be to calculate and compute
improbable situations into pictures, to bring information,
catastrophes about. Artificial intelligences will also be in dialogue
with human beings, connected through cables and similar nerve
strands. In terms of function, then, it will be meaningless to try to
distinguish between natural and artificial intelligences (between
primate brains and secondary brains). The whole thing will
function as a cybernetically controlled system that cannot be
divided into constituent elements: a black box. The prevailing state
of mind will be reminiscent of the one we experience in our
creative moments, the experience of being out of oneself, of
adventure, of orgasm.57
Technical images, and telematics, are our attempt to overcome death through
information, despite the potential dehumanizing costs. Telematics are how Flusser sees
the endpoint of the global-image network. Telematics are how we will attempt to make
the best out of what in the end amounts to little more than enslavement to the image and
the machines that create it.
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Flusser’s Conceptions of History, Communication, and Culture

The most important contribution Flusser made was his description of the universe
of technical images. But in order to understand what is meant by the universe of technical
images, one must first understand the larger scope of Flusser’s view of information and
history in general. Flusser defines a variety of terms which although familiar sounding,
have a very specific definition within his framework of information and subjectivity. This
can be somewhat tiresome, but it is worth the effort, as his framework allows for
profound insights into the nature of images and visual culture. The simplest way to sum
his project is to describe it as: 1) a history of culture informed by a specific definition of
information (and also how abstracted this information is from our experience); 2) the
apparatuses that create that information; 3) the human relations created by those
apparatuses; 4) and the second law of thermodynamics. That is: the universe tends
towards disinformation:
The species Homo sapiens, life on earth, the earth itself will finally
follow the world’s general tendency to lose information and be
dissolved (second law of thermodynamics). And such information
decay is more fundamental than information production because
information is produced through improbable accidents and decay
occurs through probable accidents.58
For Flusser, human history consists of the arrival at further abstractions into media in
order to make sense of the world through information. When this world becomes too
intense or complex to be understood a system is produced that takes the previous into
consideration but more succinctly or effectively arrives at random possibilities. Technical
images are the final step of these continuous abstractions. Technical images are so
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abstracted from our experience that we are in fact almost totally alienated from producing
with them: most of the work is done by the apparatus, which relegates us as functionaries.
Our function is to create informed objects, objects which allow us to resist the second law
of thermodynamics:
Taken as a system, nature is one in which information tends
progressively to disintegrate according to the second principle of
thermodynamics. Man opposes this natural tendency towards
entropy not only by acquiring, storing and transmitting
information, but also (and in this he differs from all other
organisms) by intentionally producing information. This
specifically human, anti-natural faculty is "spirit," and it results in
"culture," that is, in objects which have improbable forms, in
"informed objects.”59
The second law of thermodynamics is a cornerstone of Flusser’s thinking. The law states
that the universe tends towards a state of entropy. Essentially, whenever heat is
transferred between objects, some of it dissipates, or is lost. As that happens there is an
increase in entropy (“randomness”) and a move towards further homogeneity of the
universe: “The second law of thermodynamics suggests that the emerging particle
universe tends toward an increasingly probable situation, toward disinformation, that is,
to a steadily more even distribution of particles, until form is finally lost altogether.”60
A simple way of thinking about this problem is picturing an ink droplet
dissipating through a cup of water: that’s simply the most likely statistical scenario, that
the particles of the droplet would go in random directions rather than towards a central,
unified position. Another way of thinking about it considering a room which is very
neatly organized: if anything is moved it is likely that it will be put out of place. A room
which is highly disorganized will probably not change at all if a random object is moved
59
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in a random direction: it will likely stay a mess. As a result, the most likely scenario for
the universe is one of total homogeneity, in which particles are spread equally throughout
the universe. In the lexicon in the back of “Towards a Philosophy of Photography,”
Flusser defines entropy as “the tendency towards increasingly probable configurations.”61
Entropy is guaranteed, and it’s essentially informational death. It is coming for us. The
second law of thermodynamics “suggests that the emerging particle universe tends
toward an increasingly probable situation, toward disinformation, that is, to a steadily
more even distribution of particles, until form is naturally lost altogether”.62 This is to say
that, without intervention, heat tends to dissipate between objects and spaces, ultimately
(and inevitably) leading to a world of complete sameness. This infinitely probable state is
one of no information, and hence one without humanity. Heat death is a state of complete
informational sameness, where everything is a soup spread throughout every space: “The
last stage, heat death, is a probability bordering on the inevitable, and this stage can be
calculated in advance with a probability bordering on certainty.” Probability is what
connects information, the apparatus, and the functionary, and it is where a breach for
intention (and hence humanity) opens up in the most desperate way. We create
information with the apparatus, and hence open up a space in which we cannot only
express our will against entropy, but also our desire to connect beyond what is
informationless and filled with sameness. With the apparatus, not only do we abstract and
search for who we are in a relentless, particle-filled, data-driven universe, but we also
reach out, we touch from a distance:
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If one interprets the negentropic tendency of human communication
instead of trying to explain it, then it appears in a different light. In this
case, the accumulation of information is not seen as a process that is
statistically improbable but possible. Rather, it is seen as a human
intention— not as the result of accident and necessity, but of freedom. The
storage of acquired information is not an exception to the law of
thermodynamics (such as in information sciences), but rather, it is the
perverse intention of a human being condemned to death.63
A homogenous universe is one in which particles are spread equally throughout all spaces
-- it is by definition a non-informational universe. Flusser would put that things have not
been “in--formed,” they are the same: “the cosmos is, for us quite spontaneously, an
apparatus which contains an original piece of information within its input (“the big
bang”), and which is programmed necessarily to realize all of this information by chance,
and thus exhaust it (“thermic death”).”64 There can be no history if the system is
homogeneous, therefore this state is both post and pre-historic. A final state of entropy is
guaranteed. As a result, we are given a way to fight this non-informational world of our
certain death. The way in which we fight against it is by informing objects. Informing
objects is the ultimate human labor:
Tools as such are objects which remove other objects from nature
to put them where we are - in order to produce them. In doing so,
They change the original form of those objects, impose a new form
on them; in other words, tools inform objects. The removed objects
thus acquire an anti-natural, improbable form, and they become
cultural objects. This productive and informative action is called
"to work," and its result is called "a work." Some works, such as
apples, for example, have been produced without having been very
much informed. Other works, such as shoes, for example, have
been highly informed in the course of their production: their form
is highly improbable to animal skins (leather). So, scissors which
remove apples from trees are tools which inform very little,
because apples on a plate look very much like apples on a tree; on
the other hand, needles which remove leather shoes from animal
63

Flusser, Vilém, and Andreas Ströhl. "What Is Communication." Writings. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota,
2002. 6. Print.
64
Flusser. Towards a Philosophy 56.

38
skins are tools which inform very much. Is it thus true that the
photographic camera is a kind of needle simply because
photographs carry very much information?65
This is how the camera and computer come together: despite their differences, the
photographic image and computing were actually always joined at the hip. Producing
technical images (that is, images created by a machine or apparatus) is primarily a
computational process: it involves a user (“functionary”) pressing keys in order to
puncture particles out of space. The place from which the functionary punctures these
particles is many times over alienated, and many times over abstracted from his own
subjectivity. But where did that subjectivity start for Flusser? Was there a period of
happy triumphant human spirit? This is hardly the case. Flusser summarizes the history of
human culture and communication as a series of abstractions and alienations. As a result,
the place in which we find ourselves is the most deeply alienated and most abstracted: we
have taken several steps away from an immediate connection to the world into a place in
which we probe for meaning with machines through the sorting of particles, particles
which collide against each other in increasingly random ways, eventually into oblivion.
Flusser abstracts a time during which people live in a state of nature in a similar
tradition to Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke. The state of nature is a period during which
people have no contact with “information” per se. That is to say, they behave in purely
instinctual and unmediated manners -- there is nothing in between them and nature -- no
laws, no tools, no conflict other than the immediate danger posed by the physical world.
This is the first distinct era of human development and the first step/dimensions of human
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experience.66 From here, Flusser develops each of the steps that lead towards the
technical image, the apparatus, the functionary, and the modern information society that
we live in today. Each step in the development of information towards today is called a
further “abstraction” from our original existence. Each abstraction, as a result, takes us
further away from the state of nature, while at the same time taking us deeper into a mode
of thinking which allows for a particular type of probing, one which, it seems, allows us
to inform in different ways, even if these ways are more and more tenuous. By inform is
meant gathering within the bounds of a particular abstraction. Flusser often uses the roots
of words as key parts of his argument. Take, for example, his exploration of the roots of
apparatus:
The Latinate term ,"apparatus" stems from the verb "apparare," which is
"to prepare." Latin also contains the verb "praeparare," however; the
difference is one of prefixes: "ad" ancf "prae." The most available
translation for "apparare" in English would be "to make ready." In this
sense, an apparatus would be an object which makes itself ready for
something, while a "preparation" would be an object which patiently waits
for something. The camera makes itself ready to take pictures, tries to
ambush them, is on the lurk for them. This Iying-in-wait for something,
this predatory character of the apparatus, must be understood in our
attempt to define "apparatus" etymologically. (TAPOP 15).
The same sort of explanation is possible in the realm of the word “inform.” To
inform is not only to make information available, but also to gather in an abstract
realm disparate particles that once brought together create new possibilities. The
production of these cultural possibilities is the realm of freedom for Flusser: it is
the realm in which we can fight out mechanization in order to express both our
humanity and need to communicate, but it is also a place in which we can
“sabotage” the apparatus towards showing its inherent machine-like existence.
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With this sabotage we are able to de-humanize the growing informational
apparatus which threatens to out-human us with its incessant and ever more
confusing number of creations.
Each of these progressive inventions alienates us from the world (pure
existence/lack of subjectivity) while along the way losing a “dimension.” It is also called
an alienation or mediation from that original experience.67 By losing a dimension it is
meant that each progressive mode of mediation, although more focused and perhaps able
to contain denser information, is also more compact and directed in its storage
mechanism/media, and hence in its mediative/transformative power. This is to say, the
traditional picture can show you a wolf, but a cave wall cannot quite tell you a
complicated story with much nuance. A text might tell you a story with nuance, but it is
dependent on a linear and thus more abstract mode of mediation. The computer might
show you a story of unimaginable complexity, including data points from the beginning
of time. Yet how abstracted is the computer? What kind of images does it tell and how do
they relate to our original stance as unmediated beings? In short -- the more abstract we
get, the more can be contained within the media we devise. And yet where do we find
ourselves as we tumble into abstractions?
The levels of abstraction that lead to today are as follows. First, the most primitive
humans, before advanced language, experienced the world, strictly as concrete and direct
stimulus. They are “Animals and “primitive” people are immersed in an animate world, a
four-dimensional space-time continuum of animals and primitive peoples. It is the level
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of concrete experience.”68 They have no capability for abstraction of information and to
extrapolate on concepts. Flusser calls this first level of information, that of the state of
nature, a space of unmediated experience. Every stimulus or event is seen as some sort of
direct, unfiltered contact. There is mystical thinking, magical thinking, or community
other than in an animalistic sense. This is a world of many “dimensions,” insofar as
nothing is really strange and the only sort of human action is response or instinct. What
happens next defines Flusser’s study.
Next, imbued with an innate ability to communicate and overwhelmed by the
“realness” of their experience, some humans begin to strike for means of mediation in
order to make sense of their experience. They first begin to shape tools and materials in
the world around them: “The kinds of human beings that preceded us (approximately two
million to forty thousand years ago) stood as subjects facing an objective situation, a
three-dimensional situation comprising graspable objects. This is the level of grasping
and shaping, characterized by objects such as stone blades and carved figures.”.69 This
primitive human begins to capture materials from the outer world and mimic their own
movements through tools: “Machines are simulated organs of the body. The lever, for
example, is an extended arm. It increases the ability of the arm to lift and ignores all the
other functions the arm has. It is more ‘stupid’ than the arm, but it therefore reaches
further and lifts heavier loads”70 71
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The primary way in which they do this is by painting or etching on the walls of
caves. But cave paintings have a non-linear, eternal recurrence nature to them. A cave
painting showing a fire, a wolf, a few people, and a tree can be read in a multitude of
ways, some of them mundane, some of them mystical, neither more right or wrong than
the other. One might look at the cave painting and decide that the wolf should be looked
at 3 or 4 times for the story to come together. One might decide the wolf is already dead.
Neither wrong. So the cave painting does allow previously unmediated humans to use a
surface upon which to reflect, that is, upon which to abstract and mediate themselves as a
way of understanding themselves and their world. An animal in the forest that might pose
a threat, it exists according to its location and its actual presence. A sculpture of that
animal (an abstracted, mediated version of the animal), can communicate and point us to
its existence, as human mediated shadow of the actual animal, reduced to three
dimensions, that of length, width and height. Traditional images such as cave paintings,
further reduce the dimensions of communication to two: length and width, allowing us to
express more, but further removed from what the animal actually “was.” In this way a
cave painting could represent an object out in the concrete world as a guide, as a map.
But the map is confusing. Just how do we read these pictorial involvements? Just what
were these early humans searching for in their drawings? These cave paintings are what
give rise to hieroglyphs. The traditional image, for instance, is a “two-dimensional
mediation zone between [the subject] and its environment”.72 This mediation, a realm of
magic and eternal recurrence, is also a mode of alienation, in that it allows early humans
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to explain themselves, but only in so far as they remove themselves from the environment
which they were trying to explain.
In the next phase, when this eternal recurrence and elusiveness of the cave
painting becomes too overwhelming, another abstraction occurs: someone begins to place
the pictorial symbols in order, creating a primitive version of linear writing. The most
basic example of this would be Egyptian hieroglyphics. Linear writing causes a further
level of abstraction and mediation, taking us one step further from our original existence.
Linear writing introduces a brand new concept: that of causality. This is “a zone to which
human beings owe most of their insights” (Into the Universe, 7). Putting things in order
finally allows humans not only to mirror their experience through mediation, but also to
get farther and farther away from merely descriptive means of mediation. In losing the
dimension of the image, writing allows humans to go beyond the wall, beyond the
pictorial. If the statue was once removed, and the painting once more, then writing is
thrice removed from the original. Yet writing can go so much further: unlike with the
pictorial, the early human writer is no longer tied to concepts that require the two
dimensions of the wall. The early human writer has stepped down another level of
abstraction, another level of alienation: he is now in a one-dimensional (backwards and
forwards) system of information, linear writing. This ability to go in one direction allows
the early human writer to probe depths completely unavailable to the drawer. This is a
momentous occasion: the birth of history, and the birth of technology. The early writer
uses writing in order to make sense of the increasingly complicated cave paintings, but is
only able to do so by losing a dimension and by getting further away from them.
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Keep in mind that this is a fall by definition: once writing is invented, there is no
going back. Just like the invention of cave paintings created a subject which was a
drawer, the creation of writing creates a writer: someone who thinks linearly, someone
who can abstract away from mere occurrences, someone who can “think.” People created
writing, and in doing so created a space (or more precisely, a medium) into which they
could abstract and therefore have a linear, causal consciousness. For Flusser, nothing
from before the creation of linear writing can be truly remembered, first because it’s not
clear that there was a developed concept of causality prior to writing. As a result, nothing
from before the invention of linear writing actually “happened,” it “merely occurred” in
an unexplainable way. This is similar to the way in which very young children experience
the world: they don’t yet have a steady consciousness which allows them to abstract
causality. As a result, children under a certain age only have two modes of existence:
happy and content, or utter, sheer terror. That’s because these children don’t really
understand what is happening, but rather feel it as a horrifying, unexplainable and
potentially fatal event. It must have been much the same to primitive, pre-literate humans.
The abstraction of writing and the alienation from our experience is what allowed us to
explain how things happen, it is what allowed us to look deeper within ourselves, even if
only in an alienated, abstract space. It is the birth of history, and as history progressed
writing became more and more convoluted, better able to explain causality and abstract
concepts, but farther and farther from something that was immediately and directly
connected to us. We became confused because of the sheer, terrifying number of
sentences, books, and articles. There is a toll on the subject to this continuing investment
in linear writing. Writing takes humans into a world where many advancements are
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possible: communication from a distance, scientific texts, the gradual compounding of
information, the spread and sharing of knowledge. As a result, the level of abstraction
(the directions in which they probe and the abstract concepts which they find) becomes
increasingly more overwhelming. People become so far removed from their original,
unmediated lives that writing becomes their world. People’s every moment and care
becomes entangled in a severely abstracted, heavily mediated world of linear concepts.
Finally, as a result, humans began to look for a way of making sense of
increasingly complicated and abstracted linear texts. This led to the final fall from
existence, a final embrace of abstraction, and the final step in mediation: the invention of
the apparatus, the first example of which is the camera. When texts cease making sense,
the subject alienates himself one last time by losing linearity and condensing into
particles: the technical image/camera is invented.73 The technical image, unlike the
writing, is not limited to a linear space. The technical image is, in reality, a deeply
concentrated accidental object pregnant with meaning and deception. Just like the linear
text allowed man to make sense of a world of confusing and overwhelming separate
pictures, the apparatus/camera becomes further alienated and further abstracted by cutting
out linearity entirely. The apparatus does not deal with the linear, but rather with the
singular. Whereas the linear writer created a history that probed to some depth, the
functionary uses the camera/apparatus to probe something even deeper: a mere instant
73
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captured as data. Whereas the writer wrote, the functionary/data gatherer merely presses a
button, and with that captures universes of particles. It is no wonder, then, that the
apparatus signals the end of history; the end of linear writing74. The button is a
disturbing, seemingly simple device that seems to put the functionary/man in control, but
this is deceptive. The functionary does not quite grasp the apparatus entirely; even a child
can operate a camera. As a result, the apparatus calls upon the functionary to find the
possibilities within it to generate ever more random events of improbability. The
functionary becomes, as a result, a heavily abstracted user seeking to explain his own life
and experience through the use of an apparatus he does not understand which
punctures/captures moments of data from an otherwise continuous world. But the
apparatus is overwhelmingly complicated, much like the depths of data and existence,
which it is seeking to explore.
There is an odd beauty to the way Flusser entangles each mode of information
with each of its particular user: the mode of information creates the user. The human who
painted caves is a new man; the human who wrote texts became a new man, influenced
by the texts and its alienated heft while also probing into worlds far from what he saw
with his/her eyes; the human who looks through the camera or types in his computer is
yet again a new human, one who sits in front of an apparatus searching for meaning in a
vast landscape of data points and abstractions. Each creation of a new media is a deeply
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felt, completely transformative loss of dimension and also a moment of creation of a new
man, a man descending a step-ladder which creates for him a new mind, one which
abstracts itself further and further into the next age of information, and a new subject is
called upon at each level. It is worth quoting Flusser at length here:
According to the suggested model of cultural history, we are about to leave the
one-dimensionality of history for a new, dimensionless level, one to be called,
for lack of a more positive designation, “posthistory.” The rules that once
sorted the universe into processes, concepts into judgments, are dissolving. The
universe is disintegrating into quanta, judgments into bits of information. In
fact, the rules are dissolving exactly because we followed them into the core
of both the universe and our own consciousness. At the core of the universe,
particles no longer follow the rules (e.g., chain reactions) and begin to buzz,
and at the core of consciousness, we try to sift out the calculable basis of our
thinking, feeling, and desire (e.g., proposition theory, decision theory, and the
calculation of behavior in actemes); that is, linearity is decaying
spontaneously, and not because we decided to throw away the rules. And so we
have no choice but to risk a leap into the new. And it is truly a risk. For as
waves dissolve into drops, judgments into bytes, actions into actemes, a void
appears, namely, the void of the intervals that hold the elemental points apart
and the no-dimensionality and so impossibility of measuring the points
themselves. One cannot live in such an empty and abstract universe, with
such a dissociated and abstract consciousness. To live, one must try to make
the universe and consciousness concrete. One must try to consolidate the
particles to make them substantial (graspable, conceivable, tangible)75

In short, we make that consciousness concrete by reaching out with the apparatus, by
grasping particles and making them into technical images. The entire history of human
culture and information, along with its abstractions (and its users) are as follows: 1) the
original man, who only interacts with his environment; 2) the cave painter, who can see
the magic and eternal recurrence of the traditional image, but who eventually becomes
overwhelmed by the images and places them next to each other in an effort to make sense
of them, creating 3) the linear writer, who has abstracted himself into a world of one
dimension, of the line, a line which is not contained by two dimensions, and which
therefore can probe places which are abstract, surreal, perhaps even terrifying, bringing
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the man a glimpse of things he cannot see with his eyes but which he knows inform the
very essence of his existence, and finally, the 4) functionary, a media user who has
abstracted further from the linear dimension, and who now uses the apparatus in order to
probe an increasingly more disturbing and deeply alienated place: that of data and
particles. Much like the writer, the functionary knows that the data is meaningful, and
that it is bringing him closer and closer to the thing he was trying to explain. Although
more alienated than ever, the functionary is living in a world of deep, cohesive,
overwhelming reality: data is unquestionable. This is why we feel compelled to inform
with the apparatus: we know that the way it informs is completely bulletproof. The
apparatus is a machine, and hence human subjectivity is subtracted from it; we inherently
trust pictures more than paintings. The particles gathered by the apparatus are
overwhelming, celebratory. They allow us to come into contact with each other in ways,
which are nearly absurd when one stops to think it through. One can take a picture and
immediately have it appear across the world. That sort of transmission is what telematics
is about. It is about gathering abstracted particles towards a mutual play that celebrates
our ability to coexist and engage in a dialog in images. It is as if we are picking from an
infinite harvest of particle information.
Data, here meaning raw data and not its interpretation, does not have a human
element. Data is produced by the apparatus, and is therefore eminently trustworthy.
Finally, unlike the previous steps of alienation, which called upon the new media user to
behave a certain way, data creates a slightly more nuanced world. Because the tool of
data is the apparatus, which is a black box with its own, immutable scientific rules, the
user is now defined more violently and more forcefully than ever before. Yes, the writer-
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human was defined by writing. But the functionary is defined in a completely suffocating
and disturbing way, because, unlike the pen, the apparatus has a mind of its own. The
apparatus gathers data in a way that is not entirely controllable by the user. As such, the
user is now more under control than actually in control. The functionary has the intuitive
understanding that he is grasping at meaning through the technical image, which should
not be limited to the image produced by a camera; the spreadsheet, the database, the
computer screen are technical images that also control the functionary and impel him
towards further probing. The functionary also has the intuitive understanding, however,
that in gathering data he is in a world of utter and bizarre abstraction, looking at points
which seem to come from a nearly infinite and inexhaustible set of points, the entirety of
experience and time.
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The Faux Telematic Utopia of the Technical Image/Superbrain
Whereas the linear text makes sense of the traditional image; the camera makes
sense of the linear text and as a result of science, logic, and history, which were born with
the linear text. But the level of abstraction of the apparatus allows it to reach much farther
than the linear text. Case in point, the apparatus has allowed scientists to reach into the
depths of the history of our universe, taking “technical images” (be these pictorial or
merely data points) which reveal concepts which would be utterly baffling to the cave
drawing man or the early linear writer. Yet the steps in abstraction have allowed us to
reach a point not only of more concrete knowledge (data gathered by apparatuses), but
crucially the apparatus has also taken us towards a point of complete and total alienation.
The modern functionary intuitively knows that he does not understand the apparatus, be it
the computer or the camera, and that no matter how hard he tries, he will never exhaust
the data contained within the apparatus. Yet the apparatus, which has a mind of its own
and which impels the functionary towards abstracted exploration, beckons the
functionary. The apparatus then controls the functionary. It asks the functionary to keep
probing, probing into an increasingly murky sea of possibilities, facts, and connections.
According to Google CEO Eric Schmidt, every two days we created the same amount of
information that was created from the dawn of time up to 2003.76
Yet it feels as if we aren’t getting closer to any sort of end or totality. In fact, with
each passing year new methods of apparatus use, creation, and data gathering are created.
As a result, the functionary (i.e., the modern human who uses the internet and a smartphone) is called upon by an apparatus he/she does not understand in order to create more
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and more data, the use of which is not clear or illuminating… And yet there is an odd,
exhausting pleasure to the experience, in which the modern functionary is controlled by
the apparatus and still wants more. The brilliance of the apparatus is not that it forces us
into control, but rather that it creates a world in which we only find meaning by being
under control. To not be on the internet, to not be searching databases and sending
versions of ourselves in databases is, in a very real and unavoidable way, to not exist.
The traditional image is mediated by something that is ultimately one step
removed from the world of experience and data: human subjectivity. This is to say: in
order for a painting to exist physically, it must first be painted. In order for a painting to
be painted, it must first go through the subjectivity of a human being, and hence be
interpreted and changed from whatever situation or concept originally inspired it out in
the “unmediated” world of existence and the real. The technical image removes the
human element. The human involvement is relegated to a completely marginal and
ultimately miniscule role: that of pressing the shutter or key. As a result, the technical
image is inherently trustworthy. When you see an image taken by a photochemical black
and white camera, the “thing” you are seeing in the paper is a physical byproduct of a
definite, robust, and unchanging object: the apparatus. The difference between the
traditional image and the technical image is the following: the technical image requires
the absence (or relegated) presence of the human. The technical image requires that we
accept that true, topical meaning to our world is now created in our absence. A second
line of criticism is that the picture can be played with or otherwise tricked into showing
something that is not there. But this is patently false, because the point of the technical
image (the “photographic picture”) is precisely that it is not pictorial, that it is not image
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based but rather based on data. Because it is based on data, and because of the growing
connectivity and ability of the different cybernetic apparatuses, production of information
has moved farther and farther away from human control. As a result, this monumental
amount of information, which is at once difficult to comprehend, is also increasingly less
and less human. They are abstractions completely alienated from our understanding, both
in scope and in their origin:
The technical image is one produced by an apparatus. Apparatus, in turn,
are products of applied scientific texts, making technical images indirect
products of scientific texts. The historical and ontological position of
technical images is different from the one occupied by traditional images
precisely because they are the indirect results of applied scientific texts.
Historically, traditional images were anterior to texts for tens of thousands
of years, and technical images succeed to I advanced texts. Ontologically,
traditional images are first-degree abstractions, since they were abstracted
from the concrete world. Technical images, for their part, are. third-degree
abstractions; they are abstracted from texts, which- in turn are abstracted
from images which were themselves abstracted from the concrete world.
Again historically, traditional images may be called "pre-historical," while
technical images may be called "post-historical," in the sense suggested
previously. Ontologically, traditional images mean phenomena, while
technical images mean concepts. Deciphering technical images implies a
reading of their position.77 (TAPOP, 10)
What you see when you look at a black and white film photo is not an image, but rather
the result of light hitting a photo-sensitive material and then being exposed to chemicals
for the precise amount of time needed for the material to resolve in a way which is visible
to our eyes. Hence the idea that a manipulated image is still “true” -- it is showing us the
byproduct of a technological process. Whether or not that technological process took
place in one, two, or three steps, multiple exposures, collages, or otherwise, is immaterial.
The same is true of 3D models and technical images which are not taken by a film photo
camera: they are the byproduct of a technological process which expresses the
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relationship between data points. The data points in the case of the film photo are: camera
location, camera angle, shutter speed, lens length, exposure time, framing decision, and
so on. Each variation in one of those attributes creates a new technical image, a new set
of data points. To say that a 3D image created by a computer, say, an AutoCAD model, is
less “real” than a film photo is preposterous: as the byproduct of a set of technological
processes and relations, the AutoCAD image is closer to its abstract self (i.e. its existence
as data) than the film photo is, which was alienated through the process of being
developed.78 Both are technical images. To say that something which is closer to its
nature (the AutoCAD image) is “faker” than something which looks more like the real
world to us (the black and white photo) is intellectually lazy.
It is the sign of someone that wants to believe that a photo (a technical image) is
just a photo because it looks like something we know and understand. In fact, anyone that
knows anything about photography knows that color photos are less real than black and
white photos, because the color in color film has nothing to do with color in real life, and
everything to do with different chemicals being used in developing a different type of
film. As a result, color in photos never look like real life, because they are real life, but
rather another technological abstraction. Black and white photos, on the other hand, are
closer to real life, because they are less technological abstracted. Hence the haunting and
powerful, “real” nature of black and white photos, which look much more real than color
photos to those who are willing to look closely enough. Looking closely means looking
beyond what is just right in front of your eyes, and looking into the processes that created
the object before you. Anyone that looks like that cannot come to the conclusion that a
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photograph is “just an image,” just like that person looking closely cannot come to the
conclusion that painting and a technical image are the same: they are different levels of
abstraction probing towards a completely different level of knowledge. To make a final
point and exhaust all sense of doubt, one must simply accept that the black and white
photo as a technical image is not pictorial, despite the fact that it looks like that and that
it’d be easier for us if that were the case. Things are not what they seem. The photo is
data; and the pictorial illusion is a mediated byproduct of that data. We are subservient to
these processes as functionaries.
As functionaries, we have certain drives and tendencies, but our choices are
severely limited: we can only take photos which are possible. The number of possible
photos is large, but it is not infinite:
Considering the camera (or any apparatus, for that matter) from
such an angle. we can see that it is meant to produce symbols. It
produces symbolical surfaces according to some prescription
contained within it. The camera has been programmed to produce
photographs and every photograph is the realization of one of the
virtualities contained in that program. The sum of those virtualities
is large, but not infinite. It is the sum of all those photographs
which may be taken by this camera. Granted a camera may take
almost infinitely the same or similar photographs, again and again
and again - but this is not very interesting. Such photographs are
"redundant": they carry no new information; they are superfluous.
For our purposes, we can forget such redundant photographs.
restricting ourselves to informative photographs alone; thus. the
majority of "snapshots" as such are here eliminated from
consideration.79
But why are informational technical images to be desired? Why are they something worth
dedicating our lives to? The answer is simple: survival. By gathering these particles (by
informing them) we can create accidental (more on this later) objects which go ever
79
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slightly against entropy. Technical images, in their deeply informed character, are
negentropic: they negate entropy. Were we to wait in an entropic state for the apparition
of a photograph, we would be waiting a long time. And yet the apparatus can create a
large number of technical images instantaneously. It is as if the apparatus fights entropy:
it creates these accidents of information in blazing speed, sorting information in a state of
high tension, going against the uninformed state of entropy. In his faux-utopia (faux
because it is a place in which we are completely consumed by images, and therefore
barely human), Flusser predicts that we will celebrate this negentropic tendency:
For the first time, people will be in a position to methodically generate
information, and not only empirical information, using a technology
modeled on perception. Information will then surge like a rising tide
against entropy. If we define human beings by their negentropic tendency,
then this is when they will become truly human for the first time, that is,
players with information; and the telematic society, this “information
society” in the true sense of the word, will be the first genuinely free
society.80 (ITUOTI, 94)
We puncture these particles in order to create technical images, abstractions which we
probe in order to understand a certain type of historical alienation, the alienation that
arises when the world becomes composed of particles and data rather than linearity.
Hence the lack of true literary geniuses today. Despite a world population far exceeding
that of the late 1500s, and despite a greater than ever ease of access to information, we
have yet to give birth to another Shakespeare, Dante, or Cervantes. The reason is simple:
important information is no longer created linearly, but rather captured out of the ether
through apparatuses that puncture particles into informed images.
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Computation; the use of technical images; these are extremely abstracted, deeply
alienated states for Flusser. He believes us to reside in a state of flabbergasting confusion,
a period in which we find ourselves to be frantic producers of accidental objects which
give us purpose, and have pregnant within them the possibility of communication and
survival, but which send us in a frenzy and come to define us in ways that threaten our
subjectivity and indeed our freedom:
There are signs everywhere that we are fast approaching a
cybernetically governed society, that society, in fact, has already
begun to change into a cybernetically governed one. There can be
no doubt that the structure of the emerging society increasingly
resembles that of a brain. The notion of technical images as a kind
of secretion of a global nervous system, the dreaming of a
superbrain, comes to mind. And these secretions, these dreams, can
be grasped as the cybernetic governance of brain function. In short,
the notion that arises here is that of a dreaming global brain
controlled cybernetically through technical images. That would be
a metaphor for the telematic society, and it may not even be so
metaphorical as it first appears.81
By control, Flusser doesn’t mean propaganda in the ideological sense; that in which some
evil party is controlling us. Rather, he means instead that our relationship with our world
and indeed ourselves is now mediated by apparatuses that critically narrow our range of
experiences and possibilities. In Marx, a crude way of explaining alienation is thus: in
some prehistoric time, man had a direct connection with the earth -- if he wanted
something, he simply plucked it from a tree or found it somewhere.82 In an alienated
world, man no longer has a connection to earth, but rather is connected through a
machine: the machine interfaces with the earth, while man interfaces with the machine.
Man presses buttons instead. This dialectical relationship is somewhat mirrored in
81
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Flusser, only we are alienated not from mother earth, but from our own subjectivity: we
begin to think through the apparatus, mainly because the apparatus teaches us to see the
world through it.
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Conclusion
We can press all the keys we want, but we cannot press keys which do not exist.
Gilles Deleuze, in a late essay titled “Postscript to the Societies of Control”, gives a broad
and far less developed warning against these mechanisms of control. His own theory with
regards to control will be further analyzed later in this essay, but for now I’d like to quote
one specific Deleuze passage having to do with the ephemeral nature of control. Control
works precisely because it is an illusion of choices, choices which make us feel like an
“artist” (emphasis mine):
Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society—
not that machines are determining, but because they express those
social forms capable of generating them and using them. The old
societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines—levers,
pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped
themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive
danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies
of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose
passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the
introduction of viruses… It’s a capitalism of higher-order
production. It no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the
finished products: it buys the finished products or assembles parts.
What it wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy is stocks.
This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product,
which is to say, for being sold or marketed. Thus it is essentially
dispersive, and the factory has given way to the corporation…
Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also
continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long
duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man
enclosed, but man in debt.83
Yet, this limited, alienated, abstracted condition is one in which there is a sense of
possibility, an utopian possibility, even. Up until a certain point in our history,
information was centrally controlled: books, television, etc. Flusser writes that with the
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rise of the apparatus, even with all of its alienations, a new possibility emerges: that of
the telematic society.
Flusser describes two potential societies ruled by the apparatus:
One moves toward a centrally programmed, totalitarian society of
image receivers and image administrators, the other toward a
dialogic, telematic society of image producers and image
collectors.84
Flusser claims that the telematic society is an utopian world in which communication
through technical images allows us to connect without having to respond to a central
authority and to live in a highly functional way. A telematic society is one in which the
power of image creation contained in the apparatus is harnessed towards human
communication. The benefit is that society becomes more democratic. Rather than simply
accepting information from a centrally controlled power (say, the church, or a
government), we can now be creators who work together. This is a utopian of a certain
sort: rather than passive receivers, people become creators. The problem arises with the
question of control and programming. Through the mechanism of the apparatus we are
made robotic, and as a result get caught in an immense, never-ending web of sharing
remixed images, a process Flusser calls both orgasmic and at the same time horrifying,
because we cannot escape it. Hence the faux utopia – we are no longer passive receivers
of information, but at what cost?
This is ultimately a faux-utopia -- its possibilities are, in some ways, desirable.
Compared to a centrally controlled information society, in which the average citizen is
simply a suffering, passive receiver of information, the telematic society, with all of its
rich visual culture and dialogic possibilities is more like a “fever dream.” In this dream,
84

Flusser. Into the Universe 4.

60
we are reduced to the bare necessities of the apparatus (we become the ultimate
functionaries), and as such are reduced to our digits (which point) and our brain, which
remixes. The connection is so dialogic and so immediate that it is felt as an orgasmic
immediacy, as if the entire world was a “global network.”
In this utopian world, there are two possibilities left to the functionary who is selfaware: he can either carve spaces within the apparatus which short-circuit it, creating a
rift that allows human intention, which Flusser calls “freedom,” to ooze out of the blind
spots of the apparatus. Another possibility is to commit suicide. Without any recourse but
to disappear into our digits and brain, we are left with no alternative way in which to
express our freedom. Flusser explains that everything that is not needed will be done
away with. In order to be in a telematics world, all that is needed is our brain and our
digits. Our brain imagines, remixes, and accepts images, while our digits point towards
particles and press keys, be these keys on cameras or terminals. As a result, we will
shrink to the bare essentials: we will be brain and digits sitting in terminals, connected in
a constant and ecstatic torrent of image-based conversations which will function as if part
of a neural network. The world will be a brain oozing images into existence, and we will
be small particles dreaming of these images. There is an option, but it is an option of
infinite and tremendous darkness (emphasis mine):
Medicine (economy) should be the means of alleviating suffering
when it does so to delay death and where the suffering cannot be
alleviated, to remove the body. In a dialogically ordered society,
death could no longer be distinguished from suicide: the decision
to put a suffering body down—euthanasia—would be made in
dialogue (e.g., between a doctor and the one who is suffering).
I chose the example of medicine not only because it is so striking
but above all because it emphasizes the cerebral nature of
suffering. As long as corporeal processes (or economic processes
of any sort) do not enter into consciousness, as long as they
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proceed automatically, they can and should be ignored. To become
interested in one’s own liver function, or in one’s morning toast, is
to miss a chance to produce pictures. Should there be a
programming error (the liver is forcing itself into consciousness by
being painful or the burned toast by tasting terrible), one would
feel obliged to reprogram, in cooperation with others. And when it
becomes clear that such reprogramming is getting on people’s
nerves (especially those nerves engaged in making pictures), there
is an option to say no, to exercise one’s veto option and forget
everything (die). For one will not be forgotten: artificial memories
see to it that what was once called the “I” is stored so that it can be
dialogically changed.85
We start from the premise that the apparatus creates a new human, the functionary, a
person that is impelled to operate the apparatus in order to probe for particles and data.
The apparatus punctures particles and data out of the existing world, in a way that is
technologically predicated and utterly reproducible. Because the apparatus impels us, it
controls us. It asks us to be functionaries. Let us call this world the society of control. In
the society of control, “we find ourselves no longer ascertainable by means of causal but
only by means of functional explanations… because the photographic universe has
programmed us to think in a post-historical fashion”.86
History seems to have stopped, in the way that we thought about history before
the photograph. The reason why history has stopped is because the amount of data has
become utterly overwhelming. The additions which are made to the collected data points
captured by technical images are informational and transmitted in scattershot and
seemingly random ways. People feel lost -- they feel as if they operate the apparatus and
yet never get ahead of it in any way. Apparatuses robotize humanity – they have a set of
priorities built into them, and it is this “rigid, unintentional functional automaticity [that]
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needs to be made the object of criticism”.87 The darkness behind the technical image, for
Flusser, is that the functionary has to act by algorithm – hardly a spiritual enterprise:
This results in a broader definition of a photograph: It is an image
created and distributed automatically by programmed apparatuses
in the course of a game necessarily based on chance, an image of a
magic state of things whose symbols inform its receivers how to
act in an improbable fashion.88
The world of the technical image is one where our sense of our humanity has been
threatened. It is a post-historical and nearly post-human world. This mechanization or
functionarization of the human leads Flusser to argue that a “philosophy of photography”
is necessary: “the task of a philosophy of photography is to reflect upon [a] possibility of
freedom – and thus its significance – in a world dominated by apparatuses; to reflect
upon the way in which, despite everything, it is possible for human beings to give
significance to their lives in face of the chance necessity of death”.89 For the functionary
there is only one mode of freedom in such an alienated environment: to press a shutter
and find his own intention within a mechanized and functionally determined universe.
Intention is a “criticism of functionalism in all its anthropological, scientific, political,
and aesthetic aspects”.90 The philosophy of photography involves being able to program
not only against the apparatus, but to fight the programming that the apparatus attempts
to pin on us. Whether the telematic society will have any room for human freedom or not
depends on our ability to program ourselves and the apparatus. The celebratory aspects of
sharing technical images with one another require that we program ourselves away from
the complicated tangles of the apparatus.
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But not all is so easy. What makes matters worse for Flusser is the fact that the
apparatus so violently redefines human activity, all the while being the last place in
which humans can express their “humanity.” The apparatus does not present itself as an
easy space for human connectivity, but rather as an object that redefines human activity
from the start. Hence Flusser’s project starts from a dire necessity to dominate the
apparatus, all the while navigating the new domain of human activity that the apparatus
immediately imposes. The apparatus is fraught with traps. Its excitement beckons us to
just create mindlessly. The goal, for Flusser, is to understand the apparatus as both the
bearer of our destruction and the unlikely (and extremely improbable) domain of our
salvation. But the apparatus, in its vast structural complexity, offers an immediate
pleasure which seeks to undermine human intention. Without the proper understanding of
the apparatus and its ability to create a (near mindless) functionary, humans are left to an
empty pleasure of simply creating and creating, but this creative process is actually
destructive: out of their amateurish ignorance, the unthinking functionary simply creates
banal, uniformed, useless objects. This is the domain of the kitsch (emphasis mine):
The maker of snapshots is different from the true photographer in that he
takes pleasure in the structural complexity of his toy. In contradiction to
the true photographer, as well as to the chess player, the amateur
photographer does not search for "new moves," for real information,
for the improbable; on the contrary, he would prefer his own function
ever more and more through increasingly automated camera
procedures. The automation of the camera, which to him is opaque,
inebriates him. Clubs for amateur photographers, for example, are places
where intoxication with the impenetrables of camera complexities occurs,
places for "trips"; they are post- industrial opium dens.91
For a functionary to find intention in the apparatus is, in short, resistance. Telematics is
the celebration of resistance through communication and democratic acceptance of one
91
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another. But it is a celebration in images, in a constant torrent of over-sharing and
remixing. Whether that is a benefit or not, is up to each functionary to decide.
In order to re-discover our humanity after we have become functionaries, we must
probe with the apparatus within the nature of the apparatus itself, in order to reveal that
although it determines us, there is more to use than to simply function, there is the
possibility to use the apparatus in order to highlight human intention and in doing so to
self-program. The functionary resists by functioning in spaces where the apparatus begins
to fail. The use of photography is crucial to Flusser’s - and our - project because the
photographic apparatus is the first of its kind; the first apparatus which re-configures the
human primarily as a functionary. All further apparatuses dealing with technical images,
among which we might include computers, databases, smart-phones, video-games, VRdevices, and so on, function from the same premise as the photographic camera: the
human is no longer a full-fledged agentic thinker, but rather a passive explorer whose
only input is to press buttons or keys grasping particles. As a result, finding freedom
within the photographic apparatus may lead us into new ways of thinking as to where
freedom may exist in further technical image apparatuses:
...if such a philosophy of photography were to succeed in its task, this
success would be of importance not only in the realm of photography but
also for post industrial society in general. The photographic universe is
only one among many apparatus universes, and it is not the most
dangerous one at that… the photographic universe may serve as a
model for post-industrial existence in general, and that therefore, a
philosophy of photography may serve as a point of departure for any
philosophy which has the current, as well as the future form of human
existence as its subject.92
In those spaces, the human finds solace in the realization that there are
things the human grasps that the apparatus was not designed to understand
92

Flusser. Towards a Philosophy 54.

65
or capture. Those who resist control are those who attempt “to create a
space for human intention in a world dominated by apparatuses” (75).
These functionaries seeking freedom are attempting to elude control. The
camera demands that its possessor (or he possessed by it) constantly
shoot photographs, constantly produce redundant pictures. This
photographic mania - of the eternally reproduced, of the repetition of
sameness (or of similarity) - reaches a point where the snap shooter feels
blind if deprived of his camera: drug addiction. The snapshooter can no
longer see the world unless he looks at it through a camera and through
the categories of the camera program. He no longer transcends the camera,
but is devoured by its greedy function. He becomes the camera's
extended automatic shutter release. His behavior is an automatic
function of the camera itself.93
The photographic, but in reality computational society described above is a realm of
control. Through the abundance and ubiquity of the apparatus, people have come to
expect a world of constant and immediate connection. This is how they are controlled –
through ubiquity and through the dialectical determination that the apparatus contains.
Yet people feel an odd freedom in always pointing, in always snapping, in always being
connected. They adapt to this flood of informed objects. People want to point; they want
to click. Their desire is to capture, to round up, to give meaning, which they know in
truth lies not in what they see, but in the massive and unending movement of near infinite
particles, which they feel, but do not understand.
The move towards constant connection and constant creation through the
apparatus, is one of total and complete desperation. We know this intuitively. A further
problem arises once we realize that this flurry of mindless apparatus driven activity
doesn’t actually help, other than in a superficial psychological way, that of being able to
say “I have searched, I have produced, and therefore existed.” Un-informational objects,
be they databases, photos, videos, or otherwise, are actually profoundly harmful. They
obfuscate. They rise towards our eyes in a sea of sameness, nonsense, and despair.
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Mindlessly created objects come back with a vengeance and threaten to suffocate us past
their point of use (emphasis mine):
Engaged against the degenerative cycle nature–culture–waste–
nature, against the decay of information, human beings devise
more and more durable supports, for example, plastic bottles
instead of glass ones. But perversely, this halts the degenerative
cycle not at the point of remembering but at the point of waste, of
forgetting. The plastic bottle is discarded just as quickly as the
glass one but lasts longer before returning to nature. Waste
accumulated in this way contaminates the environment, seeps back
into culture, and threatens to flood it with recycled, half-forgotten
things, with kitsch. In answer to this threat, sciences of the
discarded, such as ecology, archaeology, depth psychology, and
etymology, have arisen alongside the sciences and humanities.
They seek to recall the half forgotten, to master the discarded
material, a typical posthistorical problematic.94
Posthistorical also means that, through joined use of the apparatus, one is now able to be
in constant re-imagining of the past. One is able to not only experience the past through
images, but also to remix the past with new information. Hence posthistorical; outside of
a history, because everything is immediately stored and immediately made accessible
anyway. Such an existence is inherently alienated. Nonetheless, in the society of control,
telematics is the only form of freedom left to us. Telematics is the democratic embrace of
the cybernetic exchange of technical images as our fundamental purpose now that we
have been made into machines by the apparatus. Through our ever-increasing march
towards abstraction, we have arrived at a place in which meaning can only be created in
our alienation: in order to see we must cover our eyes with lenses and screens.
Flusser provides the “categorical” study of control by describing the history of
media leading up to the apparatus. This proposes an idea of what resistance or freedom
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within this system looks like: an affirmation of human intention through the use of the
mechanizing informational apparatus that controls us. Put more simply: we are enslaved
by the apparatus when we begin to use it; (it dialectically forces us into the position of a
functionary), and the only way out is to embrace this functionary status in a search for
freedom:
What is involved here is not the classical problem of alienation, but
an existential revolution for which we do not have any historical
precedents. To put it brutally: what is involved here is the challenge of
reconsidering the problem of freedom in an entirely new context. This is
what a philosophy of photography would really address. If everything has
had a cause, if everything will have an effect, if everything is
"conditioned," where is there any room left for human freedom? All the
answers to this question might be reduced, if radically simplified, to a
common denominator: The causes are so extremely complex, and the
effects are so extremely difficult to see in advance, that man (this limited
being) may easily behave as if he were "unconditioned." Within our new
context, however, the problem of freedom must be posed differently: If
everything comes about by chance, and if everything comes to nothing,
where is there any room left for human freedom? It is within this climate
of the absurd where a philosophy of photography must formulate its
question concerning freedom.95
By necessity, functionaries that resist have to be about the productive power of the
apparatus, and finding a way to harness that power towards crystalizing intention.
A philosophy of photography is necessary if we are to lift photography
into full consciousness. To do this is necessary because photography may
then serve as a model for freedom in the post-industrial context. Thus, the
task of a philosophy of photography is to show that there is no room for
human freedom of photography is to show that there is no room for human
freedom in the realm of the automated, programmed and programming
apparatus; and having shown this, to argue how, despite apparatus, it is
possible to create room for freedom. The task of a philosophy of
photography is to analyze the possibility of freedom in a world dominated
by apparatus; to think about how it is possible to give meaning to human
life in the face of the accidental necessity of death. We need such a
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philosophy because it is the last form of revolution which is still accessible
for us.96
In Postscript on the Societies of Control, Gilles Deleuze writes of a historical shift from
societies of discipline, associated with Foucault, into decentralized societies of control.
Control takes us away from spatial management and towards an ominous reality of
distributed informational programming, just like Flusser describes. One wishes Deleuze
had read Flusser prior to the essay, so that Deleuze’s language would be more precise.
Deleuze’s essay, first published in 1992, shares Flusser’s near-messianic view of our
current digital landscape – instead of our bodies being forced into a particular institution
(of which prison is the best example), we are being constantly programmed:
Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also
continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long
duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man
enclosed, but man in debt… The conception of a control
mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open
environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or
human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is not
necessarily one of science fiction.97
Today many young people even defend the NSA’s transgressions, claiming that they
have done nothing wrong and so do not fear being spied on: they want to be controlled.
They welcome it. They willingly sign up for more digital training in the forms of games
and social networks that trivialize the spying process. Deleuze comments that “many
young people strangely boast of being ‘motivated’; they re-request apprenticeships and
permanent training. It’s up to them to discover what they’re being made to serve”98.
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Deleuze is clear: there is a new system of control that has emerged out of the apparatus,
and it is the duty of young people to stand up against it.
Deleuze sets up a call to arms here: his work in this essay is to present the (now)
irrelevance of Foucault while calling upon these subsumed “young people” to be aware
of and to stringently resist that control. Having passed the torch on, Deleuze is unclear as
to what this resistance may look like, but it is abundantly clear that it must be resisted. I
ask for a brief digression: Deleuze is extremely upfront about his shortcomings in the
essay. Given a greater space for constructive narrative one ought to explore the meaning
of a 5 page essay which announces a new, troubling age all the while absolutely refusing
to interpret or react in a deliberate way against the fetters of that new age. How is it that
academics are allowed this space? How is that academics are allowed an open, semitransparent space of discourse in which they are allowed to explore systemic landscapes
all the while refusing to address their full-meaning and their own places within them?
This is all to say: yes, there is a society of control that is evident to those who have kept a
finger to the pulse of image (and therefore digital) culture. But what might the academic
do about it? Can he do more than simply shine a light on it? Can an academic who
attempts to do more even find a space to do so? Or is the academic destined (as we are
often told) to complete, banished irrelevance which then grants his institutional advance.
All of this to say: the time and mental bandwidth afforded academics allows them in turn
to closely study social and institutional changes. That time and mental bandwidth,
however, is acquired at the cost of doing the things necessary in order to advance in an
institution, in other words, it is acquired at the cost of becoming institutionalized. Is
he/she who is institutionalized capable of really resisting (in the mode of Deleuze and
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Flusser)? Is it not a tiny bit unfair of Deleuze to ask a mythical “young people” to resist
changes in a tide so massive and complicated that they require a philosopher in order to
be found? Why should young people, in their own right, not turn the tables on the
philosopher: why does the philosopher and the academic not resist? Is the philosopher
and academic even capable of resisting?
The unfairness of Deleuze’s question aside, we are left with his call to arms,
which is unequivocal: control must be resisted – “there is no need to fear and hope, but
only to look for new weapons”.99 What these weapons would look like, on the other hand,
is hard to say. Since control is dispersed, resistance will not be against a space or
particular institution, but against a logic and a program (two menacing subheadings of
the essay). Control is decentralized because it is not a place like a school, but rather an
ethic: control is what happens when people sit in front of their computers or thumb
through their phone. This relationship to digital devices dialectically creates particular
types of controlled subjects. Flusser calls these functionaries, whereas Deleuze calls them
“dividuals.” Dividuation is a process of “dissolving individual identity into distributed
networks of information,” much like what happens in contemporary society through the
use of social networks, tracking websites, data auctions, etc. Everyone one comes in
contact with computers, one is asked to become a little more computer-like – to think in
terms of databases, networks, etc. Dividuation is also made clear through a comparison
between factories and corporations. Factories, the worksite of discipline, have a clear
geographical location, and have goals firmly rooted in space, whereas “the corporation is
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a spirit, a gas”.100 Clearly Deleuze is outlining the shapes of a world dictated by the
digital. When we are treated as dividuals, there is a supreme form of alienation occurring:
instead of being treated as ourselves, we are met as data. Information is, therefore, at the
core of control. One obvious case of dividuation is the increasing simplification of
expected discourse. Facebook, for instance, asks users to share (disperse) and like
(approve), and very little else. This latter idea is easily quantifiable, being that it is binary
(1/0).
Resistance will have to be informational, or at the very least against the
informational. More than likely it would also have to strike at the root of the devices that
prop up the society of control.
In a conversation with Antonio Negri titled Control and Becoming, Deleuze gave
another hint: “the key thing may be to create vacuoles of non-communication, circuit
breakers, so we can elude control.”101 How successful is a “circuit-breaker” to a
distributed logic, however? Isn’t Deleuze’s vision of control somewhat simplistic, given
Flusser’s more robust examination of the mechanisms of control? For instance: how do
vacuoles of “non-communication” interact with the dialectical relationship between
functionary and apparatus? How does one continue to explore particles without the use of
an apparatus? Is Deleuze actually suggesting that people retreat into caves or mountains
and completely exit modern existence? The answer is no; Deleuze’s suggestion is that we
“short-circuit” control by creating broken routes through it feels like a mere pebble on the
road. Were Deleuze aware of the mechanisms described by Flusser, he would know that
100

Deleuze. Postscript 4.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Antonio Negri. "Gilles Deleuze in Conversation with Antonio Negri." Generation
Online. Futur Anterieur, Spring 1990. Web. 02 May 2016.
101

72
the problem is systemic, and not content based. Misinformation will do nothing when the
problem comes from decentralized, ubiquitous apparatuses that create an ethic. There are
obvious reasons to be dubious: does a circuit-breaker not assume the inner workings of
control by necessity? Should resistance not be more systematic? We have the basics:
resistance is necessary, should be informational, and it is against a dispersed program.
Further, we are told that the work of resistance should be left to “young people.” What
now?
The answer is given to us by Flusser: be happy with the “celebration” that is
sharing images into eternity, or commit suicide. The negative freedom of refusing to
enter this world of cybernetic control should not be underestimated. In fact, it may soon
become the only freedom we have left.
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